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EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE SANCTITY OF HOME
John Fee*
"The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the
forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind
may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but
the King of England cannot enter-all his force dares not cross the
threshold of the ruined tenement!"
-William Pitt (1763)1
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INTRODUCTION
We have heard much recently about government's power of emi-
nent domain and how it threatens homeowners. In the recent Su-
* Associate Professor of Law, Brigham Young University (johnfee@byu.edu). I
thank Tom Roberts, David Thomas, David Callies, Kevin Worthen, Jim Gordon, and
Tom Lee for helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article. I also thank my
wife, Elizabeth Jacob Fee, for assisting me with this Article, and for reminding me that
home is much more than a house.
1 Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (quoting THE OXFOR DIC-
TIONARY OF QUOTATIONs 379 (2d ed. 1953)). William Pitt's statement refers originally
to the Crown's authority to quarter troops in a private person's home. Id.
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preme Court decision, Kelo v. City of New London,2 the Supreme Court
upheld a city's taking of a residential neighborhood to clear land for a
private redevelopment.3 One of the residents who opposed the tak-
ing, Wilhelmina Dyer, had lived in her home -for eighty-seven years.
4
Soon her home and others nearby will be bulldozed because the local
government concluded that Pfizer, Inc. would make better use of the
land. Actions similar to this have occurred across the country5 and
have sparked an outcry among property rights advocates, politicians,
and legal commentators. 6
It is interesting that many who criticize the Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Kelo, and who now wish to reform eminent domain legisla-
tively,7 have rallied around the theme of protecting the private home.
The Institute for Justice, which argued Kelo for the property owners,
announced the decision with the headline: "Supreme Court: No
Home is Safe." 8 Likewise, its grassroots campaign to restrict eminent
domain is called the "Hands Off My Home" campaign. 9 Following the
same theme, only days after Kelo was decided, Senator Cornyn pro-
posed a bill in Congress entitled the 'Protection of Homes, Small
Businesses, and Private Property Act of 2005."10 Even Justice Thomas,
in his dissenting opinion in Kelo, made appeal to the "sanctity of the
2 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
3 Id. at 2658-60, 2664-68.
4 Id. at 2660.
5 See DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN (2003), available at http://
www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/report/ed-report.pdf (collecting hundreds of examples
of governments' use of eminent domain for private redevelopment state-by-state dur-
ing the period from 1998 through 2002).
6 SeeJuliana Gruenwald, Kelo Decision Unleashes Grass Roots Backlash Against Pri-
vate Property Seizures, 74 U.S.L.W. 2067 (Aug. 9, 2005). There are too many scholarly
criticisms of eminent domain abuse, especially as to redevelopment projects, to list
comprehensively. For some recent examples, see Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use
Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WAst. L. REv. 934 (2003) (arguing for a form of
heightened means-end scrutiny to avoid eminent domain abuse); Ralph Nader &
Alan Hirsch, Making Eminent Domain Humane, 49 VILL. L. REV. 207 (2004) (arguing
for a narrower public use doctrine); Symposium, The Death of Poletown: The Future of
Eminent Domain and Urban Development After County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 2004 MICH.
ST. L. REv. 837 (collecting articles on eminent domain and redevelopment, most of
which are critical of the overuse of eminent domain).
7 See Gruenwald, supra note 6.
8 The Institute for Justice published this headline originally on its Castle Coali-
tion website, http://www.castlecoalition.org (July 7, 2005).
9 See Press Release, The Institute for Justice, IJ's $3 Million National Campaign
Tells Lawmakers: "Hands Off My Home" (une 29, 2005), available at http://
www.ij.org/private-property/castle/6_29_05pr.html.
10 S. 1313, 109th Cong. (2005).
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home."' I He noted the Court's respectful treatment of the home in
cases where the government wishes to search the home, and con-
trasted it to the lack of protection when the government wishes to take
it, concluding that "[s]omething has gone seriously awry with this
Court's interpretation of the Constitution."
12
Advocates and public figures are correct to be concerned about
the government's frequent and sometimes casual use of eminent do-
main against homeowners. But the solution that reformers typically
propose, a stricter public use doctrine, provides only incidental pro-
tection for homeowners. The public use doctrine focuses on what the
government proposes to do with the land after the taking, not its sta-
tus to the owner before the taking. It makes no distinction between
homes and other kinds of property, and it offers no protection to
homeowners in cases where the government acquires land for tradi-
tional public uses, such as to widen a road, no matter how questiona-
ble the government's justification for the proposed public use.
Whatever may be said for a -stricter public use doctrine on its own
terms, much of the recent rhetoric of protecting the private home
through such a doctrine seems to be misplaced.
This Article focuses on protecting the home against the govern-
ment's power of eminent domain more directly, and strategies
whereby that might be accomplished. 13 I conclude that current emi-
nent domain law does not adequately protect the home, and that the
most effective correction to this problem would be to increase the
compensation that government must pay for taking homes. Govern-
ment should be required to pay more than market value for taking a
person's home, since owners typically value their own homes differ-
ently than the market does, and since "willingness to pay" is the most
effective way to test whether a proposed project is important enough
to justify displacing homeowners without asking courts to second-
guess the policy judgments of elected officials.
There are reasonable statutory ways of adjusting compensation to
the appropriate level of deterrence without causing the uncertainty of
heightened judicial scrutiny or of open-ended jury awards. For exam-
ple, the law might require government to pay an additional percent-
age of market value depending on how long the owner has lived in
the home. An appropriate measure of compensation should aim to
11 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2685 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
12 Id.
13 Some of the analysis of this Article might extend partially to other forms of
highly personalized property that eminent domain law undervalues, such as religious
property or family business property, but I leave those arguments for another day.
2oo6]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
deter government from using eminent domain against homes except
in cases of genuine public necessity, as measured by the government's
willingness to pay a premium above market value.
Part I describes the current state of eminent domain law, and
how it undervalues the home in relation to other types of property.
Part II discusses the public use doctrine as a partial solution. Part III
discusses potential heightened scrutiny and procedural solutions.
Part IV discusses the compensation solution and is followed by a sam-
ple statutory model for heightened compensation in cases of eminent
domain against the home.
I. CONDEMNATION LAW UNDERPROTECTS THE HOME
Judge Plager of the Federal Circuit once coldly observed, "A
man's home may be his castle, but that does not keep the government
from taking it."1 4 Indeed, while many areas of law contain special pro-
tections for the home, eminent domain law recognizes virtually
none. 15
A. The Heightened Status of the Home in Many Areas of Law
Federal constitutional law recognizes the unique status of the
home in several ways. A person's First Amendment right to possess
and read literature is enhanced in the home relative to other places. 16
A person's right to avoid undesirable speech is greater in the home
than in other locations. 17 The Third Amendment restricts govern-
ment from quartering troops in a person's home.' 8 And, of course, a
long line of Fourth Amendment cases recognize "the sanctity of the
14 Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
15 I discuss the Uniform Relocation and Assistance Act, which provides limited
relocation assistance to persons displaced by eminent domain, at infra Part I.C.
16 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (holding that government may
not prosecute possession of obscenity in the home, although it may do so elsewhere,
because "[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a state has no busi-
ness telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what
films he may watch").
17 SeeFrisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-88 (1988) (holding that targeted picket-
ing at a person's home is not protected because of the sanctity of home); Rowan v.
U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737-38 (1970) (declaring that mailing unwanted
literature to a person's home is not protected because "[t]he ancient concept that 'a
man's home is his castle' . . . has lost none of its vitality").
18 The Third Amendment provides, "No soldier shall, in time of peace be quar-
tered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law." U.S. CONST. amend. III.
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home" as a basis for special rules governing home searches. 19 For ex-
ample, in Kyllo v. United States,20 the Supreme Court held that the gov-
ernment may not use thermal imaging to measure activity in a home
without a warrant, noting that "[i] n the home, our cases show, all de-
tails are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from pry-
ing government eyes.
' 21
Some important areas of statutory and common law also recog-
nize the home as a special place worth preserving. The federal law of
bankruptcy and state debtor-creditor laws recognize a "homestead ex-
emption," allowing a debtor to keep an interest in his or her personal
home, even if the person cannot otherwise pay unsecured debts. 22
Moreover, the criminal law of many states, like traditional English law,
allows a person to use deadly force in defense of one's home even in
some circumstances that do not meet the usual requirements of self-
defense.2 3 Indeed, it was in this context that Sir William Coke made
popular the maxim "a man's home is his castle," by which he meant
"castle" in a military sense, describing the legal right of an Englishman
to use deadly force in defense of home.
24
The special status of the home in many areas of law is consistent
with philosophical accounts of property as an extension of per-
sonhood.2 5 When a person's identity becomes closely bound up with
certain things with society's acquiescence, as in the example of a wed-
ding ring, there arises a moral expectation and presumptive entitle-
19 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999) ("The Fourth Amendment em-
bodies this centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the home.").
20 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
21 Id. at 37.
22 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d) (1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005) (federal homestead ex-
emption); id. (allowing pass-through of state homestead exemptions in federal bank-
ruptcy); see also Ryan P. Rivera, State Homestead Exemptions and Their Effect on Federal
Bankruptcy Laws, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 71 (2004) (tracing the development of
the state homestead exemptions).
23 See WAYNE R. LAFAvE, CRIMINAL LAW § 10.6(b) (4th ed. 2003) (summarizing
the law of various states and comparing these to the law of self-defense); see also Stuart
P. Green, Castles and Carjackers: Proportionality and the Use of Deadly Force in Defense of
Dwellings and Vehicles, 1999 U. ILL. L. Rv. 1 (analyzing recently proliferated "Make My
Day" laws, which allow expanded use of force in defense of the home).
24 See SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 161-62 (R.H. Helmholz & Bernard D. Reams, Jr. eds., William S. Hein &
Co. 1986) (1644).
25 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982)
(discussing property as an extension of the person and the implications of such a
theory for modern law).
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ment to the continuation of the person's enjoyment of that thing.2 6
Some objects of property are more closely bound up with personhood
than others, and therefore entitled to greater protection under the
law.27 In the range of property assets, the private home generally rests
at the highly personal end of the spectrum, thus explaining why au-
tonomy, security, privacy, memory, and expression are so valued in
this personal space. For many owners, their home is an extension of
themselves, or like a part of their family,28 both in its expressive and
protective aspects. Its highest value is not as a commodity.
B. Judicial Deference Towards Eminent Domain
In contrast to other areas of law, eminent domain law regards the
home as no different than any other kind of property, and as some-
thing that is remarkably easy for government to take. The federal
public use doctrine, which ostensibly holds that government may only
take private property for public use, provides only a paper-thin de-
fense for homeowners. As the Supreme Court reiterated in Kelo, the
public use requirement is satisfied if the taking is rationally designed
to benefit the public, 29 a standard that allows government to displace
homeowners based on the mere hope that a new use of the con-
demned property would benefit the public more than its old use, with-
out accountability as to whether that hope is justified. Applying this
deferential standard of review, the Supreme Court has upheld emi-
nent domain projects based on government findings that the target
26 There are various ways to reason to this conclusion. See id. at 962-78 (discuss-
ing Locke's, Kant's, and Hegel's views of personhood and the implications of each for
property).
27 Id. at 978.
28 For example, Samuel Clemens described the Victorian home that he and his
wife lived in as if it were alive:
[I]t had a heart and a soul, and eyes to see with; and approvals and solici-
tudes, and deep sympathies; it was of us, and we were in its confidence, and
lived in its grace and in the peace of its benediction. We never came home
from an absence that its face did not light up and speak out its eloquent
welcome-and we could not enter it unmoved.
Letter from Samuel L. Clemens (Mark Twain) to Joseph H. Twichell (Jan. 19, 1897),
in 2 MARK TWAIN'S LETTERS 641 (Albert Bigelow Paine ed., 1917).
29 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2663 (2005) (describing deferen-
tial standard); see also id. at 2660 (describing how some of the petitioners in Kelo were
homeowners and others were investors, and making no distinction between them for
legal purposes).
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neighborhood is blighted,30 that the current distribution of property
is unfair,31 or that new owners would revitalize the local economy and
tax base. 3
2
Some states have imposed stricter public use doctrines than the
federal doctrine, making eminent domain generally unavailable for
redevelopment projects, 33 but this approach only limits some of the
ends for which government may use eminent domain. Even these
states require no more than a rational basis to take a home for a tradi-
tional public use, such as a road or airport, although the govern-
ment's choice of location might merely be one of convenience. 34 If a
government agency proposes to take a person's home to build a road,
neither constitutional law nor statutory law requires it to consider al-
ternatives, nor does it require any substantial justification or meaning-
ful judicial scrutiny of the government's choice.
By contrast, if a federally-funded transportation project would
negatively impact the natural environment 35 or deplete the supply of
public parks,36 federal law requires agencies to study alternatives in
depth before they may proceed. If the public project would harm an
endangered species, the prohibition is even stricter. 37 Relative to pro-
tecting the environment and public parks, however, eminent domain
law regards the protection of homes as a low priority when deciding
where to locate roads and other public goods.
30 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34-36 (1954) (deferring to a local government
agency's decision to address blight on an area-wide basis, rather than structure-by-
structure, even though this meant condemning many nonblighted buildings).
31 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-44 (1984) (upholding eminent
domain for the purpose of breaking a land oligopoly).
32 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665-68.
33 See, e.g., Sw. I11. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002);
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
34 See, e.g., Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (setting forth a set of narrow public use
requirements applicable when the government transfers the property to a private en-
tity, implying that the usual rational basis review applies in other cases).
35 See, e.g., Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152
(10th Cir. 2002) (enjoining a highway project because the government's environmen-
tal impact statement was inadequate under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) insofar as it failed to evaluate certain alternatives to the proposed highway).
36 See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (en-
joining a highway project because it would cut through a city park and because the
Secretary of Transportation neglected to find an absence of feasible alternatives as
required by statute).
37 See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (enjoining the comple-
tion of a dam that would destroy the critical habitat of the snail darter, even though
the dam was nearly completed and had cost millions of dollars to that point).
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C. The Inadequacy of Market Compensation
The requirement to pay just compensation provides a more
meaningful deterrent to government's overuse of eminent domain
than the public use doctrine. Were it not for the law ofjust compen-
sation, it would be far easier for government to overuse eminent do-
main in abusive ways. 38 The law of just compensation, however, fails
to recognize the home as anything other than an exchangeable com-
modity. Because just compensation law generally undervalues the
home, it does not adequately deter government from using eminent
domain against homes.
The constitutional measure of just compensation is "market
value,"39 which the Supreme Court has defined as "'what a willing
buyer would pay to a willing seller' at the time of the taking."4 0 Com-
mentators have long recognized that the standard of market value
does not always make owners whole.41 The inadequacy of market
value is a general eminent domain problem. 42
But the standard of market value is especially harsh for homeown-
ers, who, more often than others, commonly value their own property
in significant ways that the market does not recognize. The concept
of market value predicts what strangers to the property would be will-
ing to pay for it. An appraiser would therefore see a house for its
fungible characteristics: its size, quality of building materials, proxim-
ity to important locations, number of bathrooms, etc. 4 3 By contrast,
38 See, e.g., RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 56 (4th ed. 1992)
("The simplest economic explanation for the requirement of just compensation is
that it prevents the government from overusing the taking power."). I discuss this
fiscal illusion problem and its application to homes in greater depth infra Part I.D.
39 United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510-12 (1979). Deviation
from a market value standard generally only is required when there is no ascertaina-
ble market for the property at issue, see id. at 513-14, which rarely applies to residen-
tial property.
40 Id. at 511 (quoting United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943)).
41 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 957, 962 ("It is a truism that market value ... does not compensate landowners
completely."); Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 110, 111 (2002) ("The most striking feature of American compensation
law ... is that just compensation means incomplete compensation.").
42 The Supreme Court has recognized the inaccuracy of using market value, but
has retained the standard for practical reasons. See 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at
510-12.
43 Thomas Merrill has described this as "an impersonal standard of compensa-
tion, but not an objective one," since a finding of market value necessarily depends
upon inference and a degree of discretionary choice. Merrill, supra note 41, at
119-20.
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the value of a home to one who has lived there for many years often
includes benefits that take time to develop and that are personal.
4 4
These might include a home's connection to memories, 45 its proxim-
ity to a particular community of friends and family, its ability to pro-
vide an atmosphere of stability and comfort,4 6 its ability to
communicate the owner's personality to others,4 7 its ability to re-
present an owner's personal work product, and its ability to satisfy the
unique aesthetic desires of the owner. While these benefits are largely
subjective and nontransferable, they are real nonetheless. When gov-
ernment takes such interests away from homeowners, it takes some of
the most essential elements of property. For some owners, these per-
sonal elements are far more valuable than the marketable elements of
property.
Federal and state eminent domain statutes do require govern-
ment agencies to pay more than market value in some circumstances.
Most importantly, the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Prop-
erty Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (URA) 4s requires federal agen-
cies and state agencies using federal funds to provide relocation
expenses to persons displaced by eminent domain.4 9 Relocation ex-
penses apply to homeowners, tenants, businesses, and farm owners.
50
The URA also compensates homeowners and tenants for the costs of
44 MargaretJane Radin's influential article, Property and Personhood, supra note 25,
develops the personhood theory of property in depth. As Radin explains, property
rights most deserving of legal protection are those that are closely bound to an
owner's identity and personhood, as opposed to those that serve primarily as com-
modities. Id. at 978-91. Chief among this higher class of property rights are the
rights in one's personal home. Id. at 991-1000 (applying examples).
45 See id. at 967 ("Much of the property we unhesitatingly consider personal-for
example, family albums, diaries, photographs, heirlooms, and the home-is con-
nected with memory and the continuity of self through memory.").
46 As art critic and philosopher John Ruskin famously said, "This is the true na-
ture of home-it is the place of Peace; the shelter, not only from injury, but from all
terror, doubt, and division." JOHN R. RuSKIN, SESAME AND LILIES 77 (Deborah Epstein
Nord ed., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1865).
47 See Eric H. Reiter, Personality and Patrimony: Comparative Perspectives on the Right
to One's Image, 76 TUL. L. REv. 673, 674 (2002) ("[P]roperty can be seen as essential to
personhood: our possessions are the outward manifestations of our selves, and with-
out them true self-development is impossible,").
48 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (2000).
49 Id. § 4622.
50 Id. §§ 4601(6), 4622(a)-(c).
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acquiring a "comparable replacement dwelling."51 Some states have
enacted eminent domain statutes modeled on this federal law.
52
The relocation assistance provided by the URA and similar state
statutes, however, still fails in significant ways to recognize the intrinsic
value of a home to its owner. Under the Act, a displaced person is
deemed whole if she is relocated to a dwelling that is equivalent ac-
cording to objective factors.53 Thus, like the concept of market value,
the URA's measure of compensation treats homes as if they are ge-
neric and exchangeable-as if society may force an owner to ex-
change one home for another without causing any harm. It does not
recognize nontransferable benefits that accrue to owners over time by
remaining in the same home, and which are lost when eminent do-
main forces owners to relocate.
In contrast to its valuation of homes, eminent domain law does a
betterjob of compensating business and investment property owners.
This is true for two reasons. First, the concept of market value more
closely reflects how business and investment owners typically value
their property. If an owner holds property primarily for its long-term
investment value, its current appraised Value should reflect its long-
term investment potential. If the owner holds property primarily for
the income that it currently generates, its market value should also
reflect this, using the income-capitalization method of appraising
value. 54 Even if the owner has adapted the property for a special busi-
ness use, and the use is not transferable to other locations, the owner
may determine market value according to this "highest and best
use."5 5 By contrast, a unique or personally adapted residential use
51 Id. §§ 4623-4624.
52 See 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 13.05[7], at 13-54 to -55 (Julius L.
Sackman et al. eds., 3d ed. 2004) (discussing relocation assistance for owners and
referencing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:3101 (2005)); id. § 13.19[1], at 13-182 &
nn. 21-22 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 37-6.1-3 to 37-6.1-12 (1997); Wis. STAT. § 32.19
(1998)).
53 Under the Act, a "comparable replacement dwelling" is one that is
(A) decent, safe, and sanitary; (B) adequate in size to accommodate the oc-
cupants; (C) within the financial means of the displaced person;
(D) functionally equivalent; (E) in an area not subject to unreasonable ad-
verse environmental conditions; and (F) in a location generally not less de-
sirable than the location of the displaced person's dwelling with respect to
public utilities, facilities, services, and the displaced person's place of
employment.
42 U.S.C. § 4601(10).
54 See 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 52, § 13.01[12], at 13-22 to -23.
55 See, e.g., Correia v. New Bedford Redev. Auth., 377 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1978)
(allowing compensation based on the owner's use of the property as a tire-retreading
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does not qualify as the "highest and best use" (although the current
owner may derive great satisfaction from its unique features), unless it
generates income or would be valued by others on the open real es-
tate market.
Second, there now is a trend to compensate for the loss of going-
concern value and business interruption damages when eminent do-
main forces businesses to relocate, repairing what was a significant ele-
ment of under compensation for businesses.56 By contrast, eminent
domain law recognizes no homeowner equivalent to a business
owner's loss of going concern, although homeowners also stand to
lose valuable connections to their communities when they are forced
to relocate.
Admittedly, some business owners, like homeowners, become
personally attached to their business property in ways that the market
and eminent domain statutes do not value. It seems, however, that
personal attachment is generally less likely to be a factor when govern-
ment takes business or investment property than when it takes homes,
and when it is a factor, it is less likely to be as significant. There has
always been something uniquely personal about one's own home,
making it different and in a sense of higher value than other forms of
real property, although it might not appraise as such. 57 As a famous
poem observes: "Be it ever so humble, there's no place like home."
s5
Even an individually-owned business does not approach the home in
terms of its socially recognized connection to one's personal identity,
memories, comfort, and security. Other areas of law recognize the
shop, even though there is no discernible market for the specially adapted property);
see also 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 52, § 12B.13, at 12B-133 to -137.
56 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMUAN, supra note 52, § 13.18[3]-[4], at 13-169 to
-173 (describing the trend towards compensating for going concern losses); id.
§ 13.19[2], at 13-182 to -183 (discussing business interruption losses).
57 Even traditional zoning ordinances generally treat the single-family home as
the highest, most protected use. As one classic zoning case described, in upholding
the segregation of homes from other uses:
[W]e think it may be safely and sensibly said that justification for residential
zoning may, in the last analysis, be rested upon the protection of the civic
and social values of the American home .... The home and its intrinsic
influences are the very foundation of good citizenship, and any factor con-
tributing to the establishment of homes and the fostering of home life
doubtless tends to the enhancement, not only of community life, but of the
life of the nation as a whole.
Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 234 P. 381, 386-87 (Cal. 1925).
58 John Howard Payne, Home, Sweet Home (1822), reprinted in YALE BOOK OF AMERI-
CAN VERSE 34, 34 (Thomas R. Lounsbury ed., 1912).
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unique "sanctity of the home" for this reason. Eminent domain law
does not.
This is not to say that it would be simple to measure the non-
marketable elements of home value in eminent domain law. I will say
more about these elements of home value and the difficulties of com-
pensating for them in Part IV. Moreover, I acknowledge that some
owners may attach unreasonable subjective value to their homes, and
that an ideal system of eminent domain should not compensate such
owners for unreasonable feelings of attachment or loss.59 But as long
as we accept that homeowners do commonly derive personal value
from their homes in excess of market value, and that to a large extent
this is reasonable, it follows that homeowners are routinely undercom-
pensated in eminent domain actions.
D. The Distortion of Government Decisionmaking
Because eminent domain law undervalues homes, and does so in
relation to other kinds of property, this is likely to distort government
decisionmaking, at least if one reasonably assumes that governments
are influenced by budgetary costs. 60 Current eminent domain law en-
courages government agencies to value homes based solely on their
marketable elements (ignoring the intrinsic value of homes to their
owners), and therefore encourages them to take homes more often
than they should, particularly when the condemnees have little politi-
cal influence.
Commentators have called this distortion effect "fiscal illusion. '6 1
It arises when governments' budgetary costs for a given course of ac-
tion do not include the full costs of the action to society, and so create
the appearance to government planners that a particular project
would improve the overall social welfare, when in fact society might be
better off without the action. The compensation requirement in emi-
nent domain generally serves to correct fiscal illusion, by forcing gov-
ernment to internalize the cost to condemnees, but it does not
perform this function well when the measure of compensation is inac-
curate, as when government is allowed to take owner occupied homes
for mere market value. Indeed, an inaccurate measure of 'just com-
59 See infra Part IV.A.
60 See POSNER, supra note 38, at 58-59 ("[1] t would be reckless to assume that the
government is immune to budgetary considerations and could therefore be relied on
always to buy the socially least costly inputs, regardless of their price.").
61 See, e.g., THOMASJ. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW 141 (1997);James Geoffrey
Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV.
1277, 1297 (1985).
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pensation" might in a way contribute to the illusion, by purporting to
make owners whole and therefore giving government planners a rea-
son to believe they have already accounted for the owners' interests,
when in fact they have not.
The current system of under compensation is likely to cause gov-
ernments to overuse eminent domain against homes in at least three
kinds of scenarios: (1) where the public value of an eminent domain
project does not outweigh the value of the homes to the owners, and
therefore should not happen, although the low appraisal value of the
homes makes it appear otherwise; (2) where government would maxi-
mize the public welfare by taking nonresidential property instead of
residential property for a given project, yet low appraisal values of resi-
dential property make it appear more sensible to take residential
property; (3) where government would maximize public welfare by
scaling back the size of a project and taking fewer homes, but where
low home appraisals make it appear preferable to take more.
Although it is impossible to measure the extent of this distortion,
there are many examples of governments' apparently casual and dis-
turbingly frequent use of eminent domain against homeowners that
are consistent with the theory of fiscal illusion.62 One of the most
infamous cases occurred when the City of Detroit condemned the
neighborhood of Poletown in 1981 to clear way for General Motors to
build a Cadillac plant.63 The fact that the City displaced over 4200
people from their homes, including many elderly and long-term re-
sidents, to make way for a private business that could exist in other
places might alone cause one to question the City's cost-benefit analy-
sis.6
4 But what makes the case worse is that the City rejected credible
alternative designs, including a parking garage option that would have
preserved many of the homes.65 In fact, community members
62 See generally BERLINER, supra note 5 (collecting hundreds of examples of ques-
tionable condemnations state-by-state, including many against homeowners); id. at 58
(describing examples of entire neighborhoods being condemned).
63 See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981) (upholding the action on the basis of public benefits, despite arguments that
the taking violated Michigan's public use doctrine). Although Poletown has served as
a leading precedent in eminent domain, the Michigan Supreme Court recently over-
ruled it in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004), and announced
a far more restrictive public use doctrine. For a collection of scholarly reactions, see
Symposium, supra note 6.
64 JEANIE WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED 49 (1989). The story is also
the subject of a film documentary, POLETOWN LInrEs (Information Factory 1982), in
which the residents describe how the City betrayed them, and depicts their social
protest which ultimately failed.
65 WvLE, supra note 64, at 141-42.
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presented four alternative plans to the City in an effort to accommo-
date both the plant and portions of the neighborhood, and the City
rejected all of them outright, noting that parking structures would
cause traffic delays for workers. 66 The City's failure to appreciate the
interests of homeowners appears by the fact that the City condemned
465 acres of dense urban property for an automobile plant, but only
seventy of those acres were occupied by the actual plant; a remaining
295 acres were used for green space, parking, and rail operations,
while 100 acres had no designated use at all.
6 7
Another more typical example occurred recently when the City of
Bristol, Connecticut, condemned the homes of several elderly people
to make way for a new industrial park.68 Although the residents ob-
jected and offered an alternative plan whereby the industrial park
could exist alongside one of the homes, the City rejected the alterna-
tive because it would cause the park to have an irregular shape and
because the appearance of the house might hurt the marketability of
the new industrial park.
69
While one can always debate whether a particular public project
was socially optimal, cases such as these do not inspire confidence that
governments are sufficiently motivated to consider the interests of
homeowners and look for alternatives to taking homes. As we con-
tinue to hear of government taking homes for reasons that are ques-
tionable, there is good reason to believe that fiscal illusion is part of
the problem. It is no wonder that property rights advocates and legis-
lators are calling to reform eminent domain in a way that would better
protect homes.
II. THE PUBLIC USE SOLUTION
A commonly suggested solution to government's overuse of emi-
nent domain today is to bar government from using it for private ben-
eficiaries, especially for economic redevelopment. 70 One pending
federal bill, for example, would provide that " [t] he power of eminent
domain shall be available only for public use," and "the term 'public
66 Id. at 143.
67 Id. at 49, 51.
68 See Bugryn v. City of Bristol, 774 A.2d 1042 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
69 Id. at 1050-51 & n.12.
70 For a collection of pending local, state, and federal bills that would narrow the
public use doctrine, essentially barring its use for redevelopment, see Castle Coali-
tion, Legislative Center, http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/index.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2006). Others have proposed heightened judicial scrutiny as a restric-
tion on government's power to use eminent domain to transfer property between
private parties. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 6, at 982.
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use' shall not be construed to include economic development." 7' Pro-
posals such as this aim to nullify the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo
v. City of New London72 and adopt the dissenting Justices' interpreta-
tion of the public use doctrine.
73
Whether the Supreme Court correctly applied the public use doc-
trine in Kelo v. City of New London74 and whether public use legislation
is desirable for reasons other than to protect homes is beyond the
scope of this Article. Whatever may be said, however, for narrowing
the public use doctrine for other reasons, it is at best an awkward and
incomplete way to protect the sanctity of home.
Such proposals are both over and underinclusive as solutions to
eminent domain law's failure to protect the sanctity of home. They
are overinclusive because they would prohibit the taking of any prop-
erty through eminent domain for private redevelopment, even if the
owner holds land solely for its monetary value and the government is
willing to fully compensate the owner for that value. Such a strict and
encompassing rule is not justified by the special nature of home prop-
erty, or even some broader category of property to which owners com-
monly become attached, or it would apply only to such property.75
Public use solutions are also significantly underinclusive because
they would leave homes vulnerable to eminent domain for most tradi-
tional purposes. To narrow the public use doctrine would do nothing
to deter government from casually taking homes for roads, airports,
parks, utilities, sports stadiums, government buildings, conservation
areas, military bases, and many other public uses. It would do nothing
to make sure that the government has considered the true value of a
person's home before taking it for public use, nor encourage govern-
ment to study alternatives before taking homes for a public use, nor
encourage government to take non-residential property in lieu of resi-
dential property for public use where possible.
71 S. 1313, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005). This restriction would apply to all federal
eminent domain projects and to all state and local projects supported by federal
funds. Id. § 3(c).
72 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
73 See S. 1313, § 2(5)-(10).
74 125 S. Ct. 2655.
75 One notable exception is that proposed in Connecticut, H.B. 5062, 2005 Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2005), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/tob/h/
2005HB-05062-ROO-HB.htm, which would prohibit government from taking only
owner-occupied dwellings of four or fewer units if the property would be transferred
to another private party. Although this bill is more closely tailored to the problem of
home undervaluation than other public use bills, it is still underinclusive because it
does not protect homes against traditional public uses.
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Of course, no one would dispute that roads, airports, military ba-
ses, and public utilities are necessary to society. But the importance of
these public goods as a general matter to society does not prove their
necessity in particular instances, nor does it prove an absence of alter-
natives for a given project. Just as the problem of fiscal illusion causes
government often to take homes for redevelopment projects that are
not worth their full cost to society, fiscal illusion can also cause govern-
ment to overuse eminent domain for transportation and other tradi-
tional public uses. Like redevelopment projects, transportation
projects are not always worth their full social costs: they create winners
and losers, they are often politically motivated, 76 they can damage the
environment, and they can arouse strong public opposition, including
from displaced homeowners. Where government agencies fail to con-
sider the full interests of landowners and communities before displac-
ing them, and to balance those heavy interests against the cost of
alternative projects, it is easy for agencies casually to decide to take
people's homes for public use where they should not.
For example, in 2002, Mexican authorities decided to expropri-
ate 13,300 acres from thousands of families in farming villages near
Mexico City for construction of what would be the largest airport in
Latin America. 77 The government did not consult the farmers before
making its decree, and was surprised when they resisted with force. 78
After a violent standoff of several months by machete-wielding farmers
defending their homes, the government announced a change of
plans. President Vincete Fox said, "We are not going to trample the
rights of anyone .... There are alternatives for the airport."79 Amaz-
ingly, polls showed that a majority of citizens were against construct-
ing the new airport anyway.80 Homeowners should not have to resort
to violence to convince the government that there are alternatives to
taking so many homes for public use that would better serve the pub-
lic welfare.
76 See, e.g., Gary M. Galles, Transportation Bill-Six Years of Palm-Greasing Pork, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 10, 2005, at B9 (discussing a recent $286.5 billion federal transportation
bill as an "unappetizing smorgasbord of indefensible projects" which came about
through political wrangling).
77 Richard Bourdraux & Rafael Aguiree, Standoff over Land Continues in Mexico,
L.A. TIMES, July 13, 2002, at 5; Gretchen Peters, Mexico Shows How Not To Conduct a
Land Resettlement, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 30, 2002, at 7.
78 See Peters, supra note 77, at 7.
79 Ginger Thompson, Cornfields or Runaways? Zapatas Ghost Watchers, N.Y. TIMES,
July 18, 2002, at A4.
80 Joel Estudillo Rendon, The Cancellation of Mexico City's Planned Airport Was Politi-
cally Wise, Bus. MEX., Sept. 1, 2002, at 16.
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Although in the current legal environment we hear most often
about the threat of redevelopment projects to homeowners, tradi-
tional public use projects also pose a significant threat, possibly even a
greater threat, to the sanctity of the home. The Federal Highway Ad-
ministration, for example, reports that federal-aid highway projects
displace over 2200 households per year from owner-occupied
homes.81 Other federal agencies such as the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration,8 2 combined with state and local governments,8 3 take many
more homes for airports, roads, utilities, and other public uses. Given
the likely effects of fiscal illusion, it is doubtful that so many home
losses are necessary to the public welfare.
Thus, although advocates of public use reform often make appeal
to the sanctity of the home, the public use solution seems to focus on
the wrong aspect of what makes so many takings of homes today
troubling. A homeowner is hurt just as much when government takes
the person's home for a traditional public use as when it takes the
person's home for redevelopment by a private corporation. Moreo-
ver, in either case the government's justification for the taking might
be compelling or it might be one of mere convenience or political
expediency. Proposals to reform eminent domain would more accu-
rately reconcile the interests of individual homeowners and of society
if they would focus the nature of the owner's property interest and the
strength of the government's reasons for wanting to take it, rather
than on factors associated with a narrow public use doctrine (i.e.,
81 According to FHA reports, federal-aid highway programs provided relocation
assistance to 2273 homeowner households in 2001; to 2537 such households in 2000;
and to 2593 such households in 1999 (the last three years for which statistics are
available). Federal Highway Administration, Annual Right-of-Way Statistics, http://
www.fhwa.dot.gov/realestate/stats (last visited Feb. 19, 2006) (collecting reports).
82 Although the FAA does not provide relocation statistics, it has a set of detailed
publications and regulations on how to relocate homeowners for airport purposes.
See Federal Aviation Administration, Airport Land Acquisition, available at http://
www.faa.gov/arp/environmental/land/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 19, 2006) (collect-
ing documents). These indicate that airports commonly displace homeowners to
build new airports and to expand existing ones. Indeed, my own father's home was
taken by eminent domain during the 1960s for an expansion of the Los Angeles
Airport.
83 For example, government agencies in Connecticut filed 1819 condemnation
actions during a five-year period from 1998 to 2002, only 543 of which were for rede-
velopment projects. See BERLINER, supra note 5, at 44. While this statistic includes all
real property (not just residential), it indicates that the government's core eminent
domain authority, even as limited by a strict public use doctrine, remains a significant
threat to homeowners. It also underrepresents the actual displacement effects of emi-
nent domain, because it does not include those who sold property to the government
under the threat of eminent domain.
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whether the government will rely upon a private corporation to pro-
duce the public benefit, or whether the project serves a traditional
governmental function). While a narrow public doctrine might be
justified for other reasons relating to good government, it is not an
effective or sufficient way to protect the sanctity of home.
III. ABSOLUTE BAN OR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY SOLUTIONS
If a primary goal of reforming eminent domain is to protect
owner-occupied homes, the most straightforward way to do this would
be to enact a law prohibiting the use of eminent domain to acquire
owner-occupied homes. Thus, whenever a government wished to ac-
quire an owner's primary residence, it would be required to negotiate
with the owner just as a private purchaser would.
84
There are several attractive aspects of this rule. It is the only rule
that would fully protect the sanctity of the home against eminent do-
main. And since the prohibition would apply only to owner-occupied
homes, it would leave eminent domain alternatives for many public
projects should a homeowner refuse to sell at a price agreeable to the
government. Moreover, testing an owner's willingness to sell and the
government's willingness to pay in a negotiated exchange is often
thought to be the most accurate way to determine whether a project is
worth its social cost.
85
Nevertheless, strictly prohibiting the taking of homes by eminent
domain is probably unwise, as it could in some cases threaten compel-
ling governmental interests. While many homeowners would be quite
willing to sell their land to the government for a genuine public neces-
84 In the comedy film, THE CASTLE (Miramax 1999), filmmakers depict the High
Court of Australia as fictionally adopting such a rule. The film is based on a man's
determined struggle to convince authorities that they cannot take his family's home
by eminent domain for an airport runway because homes are sacrosanct, a position
that he bases on "the law of bloody common sense." Although there is no actual rule
in Australia or in the United States barring eminent domain against homes, the fact
that this makes a successful storyline seems to indicate that it has intuitive appeal for
many.
85 Although conventional wisdom holds that without government's power of emi-
nent domain holdouts would frustrate the public welfare, some economists have ques-
tioned the seriousness of the holdout problem and have suggested that eminent
domain might be less efficient than the free market as a mechanism for acquiring
property, even for assembling multiple parcels. See Patricia Munch, An Economic Anal-
ysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON. 473 (1976) (comparing the inefficiencies of
eminent domain with the inefficiencies of the market as a means of assembling multi-
ple separately-owned parcels); see also Posting of Gary Becker to The Becker-Posner
Blog, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/06/index.html (June 27,
2005, 7:35 CDT) (questioning whether we would do better without eminent domain).
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sity (albeit, perhaps, at more than market value), some would not, and
their reasons for refusing to sell might be irrational or opportunistic.
Knowing that the public needs a particular parcel (say, for national
security reasons), some owners might refuse to sell because of spite, a
craving for power or attention, or disagreement with the govern-
ment's policies. Others might attempt to extract a windfall for them-
selves by demanding an extremely high price, even though they do
not actually value their property so much. This would allow a lucky
few to control the welfare of many, and could lead to costly bargaining
failure in the form of a bilateral monopoly problem.8 6 Given that
most fundamental constitutional rights make allowance for compel-
ling governmental interests, it would seem incongruous to allow pri-
vate property in homes to trump all other social objectives.
A more reasonable alternative to an absolute ban would be to
require a heightened justification for taking homes. Consider, for ex-
ample, a rule that government may only use eminent domain to ac-
quire owner-occupied homes when narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest, enforceable through judicial re-
view of eminent domain decisions. A legislative model for such a re-
quirement could be the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA),87 which prohibits governments from
imposing "land use regulations" that substantially burden religion un-
less narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
88
Congress enacted RLUIPA in response to a nationwide problem of
land use regulators undervaluing religious uses.89 One court has even
applied RLUIPA to restrict a city's power to take religious property
through eminent domain. 90 If it makes sense to protect religious land
uses against unnecessary government interference by means of a com-
pelling interest test, it might also make sense to do the same for
homes insofar as they are threatened by eminent domain.
Another alternative would be to impose strict procedural require-
ments, similar to those in the National Environmental Policy Act
86 See MICELI, supra note 61, at 138 (discussing the bilateral monopoly problem);
see also infra Part [V.A.
87 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000).
88 Id. § 2000cc-1.
89 146 CONG. REC. 16698, 16698-700 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and
Kennedy).
90 See Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redev. Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203,
1222 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that RLUIPA applied to a city's condemnation of
a religious center because it was part of a broader zoning plan, and therefore came
within the statutory definition of "land use regulation").
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(NEPA),9 1 that would require a city, state, or government agency to
clear certain administrative hurdles before using eminent domain
against a homeowner. The requirements might include: (1) that an
agency report on the displacement effects of project before taking
homes;9 2 (2) that the agency allow and respond to public comments
before taking homes;93 and (3) that the agency find that no feasible
alternatives exist before taking homes.9 4 Requirements such as these
would make it more difficult for governments to take homes, facilitate
public participation in such decisions, and expand the grounds for
judicial review of a government's decision. Through all of this, such
requirements could mitigate the fiscal illusion that now encourages
government to take too many homes.
Although both heightened scrutiny and procedural solutions
would help defend the sanctity of home, a drawback of both is that
their effectiveness depends largely on imprecise standards of judicial
review. Both proposals would require courts to second-guess legisla-
tive judgments related to land use planning, either in deciding
whether the government has proven a compelling governmental inter-
est, or in deciding whether the government has sufficiently studied
alternatives to the taking, and in so doing courts would probably be
inconsistent. This could cause both high litigation costs and unpre-
dictability in land use planning. It would also increase the caseload
burden of courts.
Moreover, if some courts are lax in enforcing such requirements,
as courts have sometimes been with respect to RLUIPA, 95 even proce-
dural requirements and heightened standards of review might not
provide sufficient protection for homes. After all, in Poletown the
91 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d.
92 See Adam P. Hellegers, Eminent Domain as an Economic Redevelopment Tool: A
Proposal To Reform HUD Displacement Policy, 2001 MICH. ST. L. REV. 901, 956-59 (pro-
posing a requirement that federal agencies file a "socioeconomic impact statement,"
similar to NEPA's "environmental impact statement" before taking action that would
displace residents).
93 See 40 C.F.R. § 1503 (2005) (detailing NEPA's public comment procedures).
94 This last requirement would resemble the provisions of the Department of
Transportation Act that protect parklands, see 23 U.S.C. § 138 (2000), and that were
the subject of the Supreme Court's opinion in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
95 See, e.g., Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761
(7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the substantial burden/compelling interest test of
RLUIPA only prohibits governmental action "that bears direct, primary, and funda-
mental responsibility for rendering religious exercise . . .effectively impracticable").
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Michigan Supreme Court purported to apply heightened scrutiny,96
and yet the court still upheld Detroit's razing of an entire neighbor-
hood-a case that is considered by many to be the paradigm example
of eminent domain abuse. On the other hand, if some courts are ex-
tremely strict in applying such requirements, as some courts have
been in applying NEPA,9 7 it could impose too great a cost to land use
planning and transportation objectives. Thus, while such measures
would improve the protection for homes overall, the level of protec-
tion could vary significantly in individual cases.
NEPA and RLUIPA might represent the best regulatory solutions
for protecting the environment and religious land uses, notwithstand-
ing their dependence on imprecise standards of judicial review. But
for protecting homes against eminent domain, there exists another
way to test whether the government's justification is sufficient to war-
rant extraordinary action-one that would be more predictable, in-
volve fewer litigation costs and second-guessing by courts, and that
would leave displaced homeowners better off. It is to increase the
compensation that government must pay for taking a person's home.
IV. THE COMPENSATION SOLUTION
When government is allowed to take private property without suf-
ficiently compensating owners, two problems arise. First, government
condemnations of land (even for valid public purposes) tend to im-
pose significantly unequal burdens on citizens. One owner may lose a
significant property interest to support a public project, while other
citizens contribute nothing, although the project is designed to bene-
fit them all as members of the public. The just compensation require-
ment, therefore, performs a function like that of the Equal Protection
Clause, and "prevents the public from loading upon one individual
96 See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455,
459-60 (Mich. 1981) ("Where, as here, the condemnation power is exercised in a way
that benefits specific and identifiable private interests, a court inspects with height-
ened scrutiny the claim that the public interest is the predominant interest being
advanced. Such public benefit cannot be speculative or marginal but must be clear
and significant if it is to be within the legitimate purpose as stated by the
Legislature.").
97 The leading case for strict judicial enforcement of NEPA is Calvert Cliffs' Coordi-
nating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), in
which the court chastised an agency for "making mockery of the Act," id. at 1117, and
welcomed the "flood of new litigation" that the NEPA promised to bring, id. at 1111.
See also Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1169-71
(10th Cir. 2002) (finding the Department of Transportation's environmental impact
statement in support of a federal-aid highway inadequate for, among other things,
failing to adequately consider alternative transit options).
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more than his just share of the burdens of government"98 by making
the general taxpayers, rather than condemnees, bear the ultimate cost
of property acquisitions.99
Second, when government agencies may take private property
without fully compensating owners, there is inadequate deterrence of
harmful governmental action. 10 0 The just compensation requirement
serves to correct the problem of fiscal illusion by forcing government
agencies to internalize the social costs of eminent domain actions,
thus making it more likely that they will undertake only those projects
that are socially justified. 10 1
Both of the problems that the just compensation requirement ad-
dresses (unequal burdens and the overuse of eminent domain), ap-
pear when eminent domain law fails to recognize the intrinsic value of
a person's home and instead values it solely on market appraisals. In-
deed, the widespread criticism that state and local governments today
use eminent domain too frequently against homeowners for insuffi-
cient reasons, 10 2 causing significant harm to these homeowners be-
cause of their unluckiness that others want their land,10 3 is exactly
what one should predict from a standard of compensation that is inad-
98 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
99 See John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV.
1003 (2003) (analyzing the Takings Clause, including regulatory takings jurispru-
dence, as a requirement that government treat citizens equally).
100 See supra Part I.D.
101 Of course, the Takings Clause does not internalize all social costs and benefits
of governmental action into budgetary costs and benefits, given the many direct and
indirect ways that government actions harm and benefit people. See Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001) (proposing a system of "giv-
ings" jurisprudence whereby owners who benefit from government action must com-
pensate the government). However, it does at least attempt to do so for those citizens
who are singled out in their capacity as property owners to contribute to government
projects. Since eminent domain allows government to single out one or a few owners
to make a unique and substantial contribution to society, and since those owners
often have little political influence when their numbers are small, the problem of
fiscal illusion is especially likely to emerge vis-a-vis the interests of condemnees in
eminent domain. It is therefore reasonable to require government to compensate
condemnees as a correction to fiscal illusion, without attempting the impossible task
of internalizing all indirect social costs and benefits into a government's budgetary
costs.
102 See, e.g., BERLINER, supra note 5 (collecting many examples of troubling emi-
nent domain cases); James W. Ely, Jr., Can the "Despotic Power" Be Tamed? Reconsidering
the Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain, 17 PROB. & PROP., Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 31,
31 ("Rightly or wrongly, many individual property owners-homeowners and small
business operators-see themselves as victims of governmental abuse.").
103 Nader & Hirsch, supra note 6, at 219-22 (describing the plight of homeowners
who are displaced by eminent domain).
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equate. Because undercompensation lies at the root of the problem,
perhaps increasing the measure of compensation is the most sensible
solution.
To adjust the law ofjust compensation to account for nonmarket-
able elements of home ownership would be consistent with the pat-
tern of expanding remedies in tort law, which has served to correct
similar problems of inequity and underdeterrence. For example, it
used to be the established law in wrongful death cases that the surviv-
ing family members could recover only their pecuniary losses associ-
ated with the decedent's death, usually meaning the decedent's lost
income, 10 4 as if family members are only worth to each other what
they are capable of earning. In most states, tort law has now corrected
this flaw by allowing some form of consortium damages or emotional
harm damages in cases of wrongful death. 10 5 Similarly, although tort
law used to forbid all sentimental damages for loss of personal prop-
erty, many states now allow owners to recover sentimental or emo-
tional damages for the loss of certain kinds of personal property that
owners typically value more than market value, such as family pets,
heirlooms, and photo albums. 10 6 In such cases, the owner may be en-
titled to damages based on the property's unique value to the owner,
not merely market value.
10 7
Suppose that eminent domain law followed the trend of tort law
and expanded the recognition of home value, using the compensa-
tion requirement as the primary means of deterring unjustified home
104 See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.3(5), at 439-40 (2d. ed. 1993) (dis-
cussing the traditional rule in wrongful death as allowing only pecuniary losses, and
the problems with such a rule).
105 Id. (discussing how most jurisdictions now recognize a remedy for lost consor-
tium, whether by statute orjudicial decision, and about one-third allow direct recov-
ery for mental anguish).
106 See, e.g., Chryar v. Wolf, 21 P.3d 428, 430 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (awarding
sentimental damages for loss of photos, journals, and other personal items due to
intentional tort); Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066 (Haw. 1981)
(awarding mental distress damages for negligent death of a pet); Bourgeois v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 820 So. 2d 1132, 1137 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (awarding damages in excess of
market value for lost engagement ring).
107 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 104, § 5.16(3), at 908 & n.8 ("[Clourts have had to
explain that they do not exclude all claims based on the owner's special attachment
but only those based on a 'mawkish and unreasonable attachment,' and have allowed
limited recoveries for sentimental value or something that seems indistinguishable
from sentimental value in cases of pets, family photographs, heirlooms and personal
trophies." (citing Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 593 P.2d 1308 (Wash. 1979))). Courts
also commonly determine damages based on "value to the owner," as opposed to
market value, in cases of destroyed clothing and household goods. Id. § 5.16(3), at
907 & n.2.
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takings. What should be the measure of compensation, if not market
value, when government takes a person's home? And who should ad-
judicate such value?
A. Applying the Indemnity Principle to Homes
The 'Just compensation" requirement of eminent domain is usu-
ally understood as an indemnity principle. 108 Of course, there are
practical obstacles to fully indemnifying homeowners in eminent do-
main. 10 9 But setting aside these obstacles fcr the moment, the norma-
tive goal of indemnifying homeowners requires a more thorough
examination.
The Supreme Court has stated that the indemnity standard aims
to place the owner "in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property
had not been taken," implying that subjective values should not
count.110 On the other hand, some commentators have suggested
that just compensation would ideally compensate for every interest
that an owner loses as a result of the government's power of eminent
domain, including what would have been the owner's right to hold
out against the government and refuse to sell at all.11' This might
suggest that the owner should ideally be entitled to some share of the
increased land value that an owner might have been able to extract
from the government (or a private redeveloper) in a negotiated
transaction. 1
1 2
108 See, e.g., 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 52, § 12-01[4], at 12-37 to
-47 ("'Compensation,' as used in the constitutional provision as a limitation upon the
power of eminent domain, implies full indemnity to the owner, that is, equivalent
(usually monetary) for the loss sustained by the owner for the land which has been
taken or damaged.").
109 See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1979) (recog-
nizing that for practical reasons the Supreme Court has not required full indemnity as
a matter of constitutional law).
110 Id. at 510 (emphasis added) (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255
(1934)).
111 See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 15-16 (1985); Fennell, supra note 41, at 963-67 (describing the various ele-
ments of property value that deserve compensation, including the owner's loss of au-
tonomy and lost subjective value).
112 Lee Anne Fennell, for example, describes the owner's loss of autonomy, the
owner's loss of ability to extract surplus from transfer, and the owner's subjective at-
tachment to property as independent property losses for which an owner should be
fully indemnified in eminent domain, although not necessarily directly. See Fennell,
supra note 41, at 965-66 (describing one element of undercompensation as the
owner's loss of surplus from transfer); id. at 1003 (concluding that an eminent do-
main action is not just unless it leaves the owner, either directly or indirectly, compen-
sated for every element of loss).
EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE SANCTITY OF HOME
I suggest that both of these positions are inaccurate as an ideal
measure for just compensation. Neither is fully consistent with the
purposes of eminent domain and of the just compensation require-
ment. Rather, the ideal measure of 'Just compensation" in the case of
taking a person's home should be the amount of compensation re-
quired to make the owner indifferent to the land acquisition at issue
(not indifferent to the government's choice to use eminent domain as
the means of acquisition), accounting for the owner's reasonable sub-
jective value.
1 13
Let us take a hypothetical case in which a government agency
seeks to acquire the home of a elderly widow to build a new highway.
Assume that the market value of the house is $100,000, reflecting what
strangers to the property would be willing to pay for it. Assume fur-
ther that the widow has lived in her home for many years and that she
is highly averse to moving, so she would be willing to sell for no less
than $200,000. Finally, assume that the highway is important to the
government, and that alternative routes would be costly, so the gov-
ernment would be willing to pay (if it had no other choice) up to
$500,000 for the widow's parcel.
In summary, the parcel has three values, based on three different
perspectives: (1) the value to the government: $500,000; (2) the value
to the owner: $200,000; (3) the value to the Market: $100,000.
Because the value of the parcel to the government is the highest
of all, social welfare is improved when government acquires the land
and converts it to highway use. This would be true whether the gov-
ernment acquired the land through eminent domain or by inducing
the widow to sell voluntarily. Two positive things occur, however, by
allowing government the power of eminent domain. First, eminent
domain helps to ensure that the socially optimal outcome will become
reality. Without the power of eminent domain, there exists a bilateral
monopoly between the widow and the government, which creates a
risk of bargaining failure. Each party, in an effort to extract surplus
from the other, might attempt to hold out at the price that they esti-
mate the other party values the land at, which could lead to stalled
negotiations.1 4 By contrast, if the government has the power of emi-
nent domain, we know that the government will get the land it needs,
113 I deal with the problem of unreasonable and extreme subjective value at infra
Part IV.C.
114 See POSNER, supra note 38, at 56-57, 62-63 (discussing the bilateral monopoly
problem in relation to eminent domain). If the bilateral monopoly problem seems
minor in this case, consider that it is magnified many times when the government
must acquire multiple parcels to acquire a project, with the possibility that only one
opportunistic holdout could thwart an entire project.
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as long as the measure ofjust compensation does not exceed its value
to the government.
Second, some would consider it unfair for the widow to extract a
large sum of money from the government (and ultimately from tax-
payers) in excess of what she personally values her land simply be-
cause the public happened to have a great need for her parcel.
1 15
Eminent domain also corrects this fairness problem, which is the flip
side of an owner suffering disproportionate harm due to the govern-
ment's need for her land. By allowing the government to acquire the
land at the price that would make the owner as well off as being left
alone, the owner will not gain an unjustified windfall at the expense of
the public.
1 16
Considering the fairness and efficiency goals of eminent domain
and of just compensation, the ideal award in this case is $200,000-
the amount that would make the widow indifferent between selling
her land and staying. To award the widow only market value for her
land, given that she values it at much more, would cause her to suffer
disproportionately for a burden that is more appropriately spread to
all taxpayers. It would also fail to deter the government from taking
homes in other cases where land's value to the government is less than
its intrinsic value to the homeowner.
On the other hand, an award of greater than $200,000 should not
be required. Although the land is worth more than this to the govern-
ment as a highway, the increased value is made possible only because
of the government's proposed project, and so it is reasonable for emi-
nent domain law to allow government to keep this surplus.' 17 Indeed,
115 Again, if this problem seems minor in this case, consider how it is magnified
many times when the government must acquire multiple parcels from similarly situ-
ated owners, and how the last few owners to hold out would have a vastly improved
bargaining position over the others, possibly gaining millions at the public expense.
116 For examples of the equity argument for eminent domain, see Howard
Gensler, Property Law as an Optimal Economic Foundation, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 67
(1995) (explaining that "[e]quity and efficiency require that the government reserve
the right to purchase property on reasonable terms for important public purposes");
Eric Kades, The Dark Side ofEfficiency:Johnson v. M'Intosh and the Expropriation of Amer-
ican Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1065, 1186 (2000) ("Governments have the
power of eminent domain precisely in order to avoid such windfalls to owners of
assets of significant public value.").
117 See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 236-37 (2003) (holding that
compensation for the taking of interest on lawyer's trust accounts "must be measured
by [the owner's] net losses rather than the value of the public's gain"); City of N.Y. v.
Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 (1915) (holding that "[t]he City is not to be made to pay for any
part of what it has added to the land by thus uniting it with other lots," but recogniz-
ing that the owner should be compensated for any potential assemblage value that
existed prior to the government's action, if the potential assemblage was apparent
[VOL. 81:3
EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE SANCTITY OF HOME
one might say that to preserve this surplus for the public is an impor-
tant reason why eminent domain exists. This not only spreads the
benefits of public projects more evenly through society (in the form of
general taxpayer savings rather than through large awards to a lucky
few), but it also helps to ensure that government agencies have incen-
tive enough to undertake projects that are socially valuable.' 18
Thus, while the ideal award should make the owner indifferent to
losing her land, it does not necessarily make her indifferent to the
government's power of eminent domain. In a world in which govern-
ment had no power of eminent domain, an owner in the widow's posi-
tion would have a chance to bargain for a selling price anywhere
between $200,000 and $500,000, given the public's need for her land.
But the ability to extract gains from the government because of the
public's special need for one's property is the type of monopoly ad-
vantage that eminent domain is designed to disable, for fairness and
efficiency reasons. 1 9 The goal of just compensation should not be to
replicate as closely as possible the distribution of entidements (includ-
ing windfalls) that would exist in a world without eminent domain;
rather, it should be to facilitate public projects that improve the social
welfare while leaving condemnees as well off as if the government had
left them alone.
B. Assembly Value and Private Redevelopment
The previous example involved the government's taking of a
home for a traditional public use. I tentatively argue next that the
measure of compensation should be the same-that is, excluding
whatever surplus value arises because of the acquisition-even where
government condemns land for private redevelopment, although
some commentators have argued to the contrary. 120
enough to affect the land's market value at that time); Boston Chamber of Commerce
v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910) ("[T]he question is what has the owner
lost, not what has the taker gained.").
118 See Merrill, supra note 41, at 133-34 (discussing the compensation structure of
eminent domain as a subsidy to encourage public goods).
119 See Gensler, supra note 116, at 66-67.
120 SeeJames E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv.
859 (arguing that just compensation should be awarded according to a continuum,
whereby additional compensation should be required as takings become further re-
moved from traditional public uses and significantly benefit private parties). Justice
Kennedy also raised several questions at oral argument in Kelo v. City of New London
implying his interest in a rule that would require a higher standard of compensation
in cases of eminent domain for private redevelopment. See Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment at 21-23, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108).
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Admittedly, when government uses the power of eminent domain
to facilitate private redevelopment, this often allows private develop-
ers to capture a bargaining surplus that might otherwise be divided
between the owner and developer in a negotiated transaction. While
the government, in its role as condemnor, could choose to retain the
surplus for itself or allocate it to the owner, there are good reasons
why the government should have the flexibility to allocate the surplus
to the developer.
First, the indemnity standard I have suggested would still aim to
leave the owner as well off as if the land acquisition had not hap-
pened, accounting for the owner's reasonable subjective value.12' In
the case of taking a person's home, this should often require compen-
sation beyond market value. Beyond indemnifying the owner, how-
ever, it is difficult to justify requiring the government to award a
benefit made possible solely because of someone else's unique ability
to improve the land.' 22 The usual deterrence and equity justifications
for just compensation do not require this.
Second, since private redevelopment does create significant pub-
lic benefits,1 23 a local government might reasonably choose to allocate
the surplus to induce a developer to use the land in a way that would
create such benefits. 124 If the government could have retained the
surplus for itself for taking the owner's property, it is reasonable to
allow the government to use the surplus instead to encourage positive
kinds of redevelopment.
James Krier and Christopher Serkin argue that a higher standard
of compensation is warranted in cases of eminent domain for redevel-
opment than in traditional public use cases because the latter gener-
121 See supra Part IV.A.
122 Of course, if there are other developers who would be willing to acquire the
land and turn it into something more commercially valuable by combining it with
other parcels, its potential for such development should be factored into its present
fair market value, and would therefore be compensable even under current law. See
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 256 (1934) ("The fact that the most profitable
use of a parcel can be made only in combination with other lands does not necessarily
exclude that use from consideration if the possibility of combination is reasonably
sufficient to affect market value.").
123 See Martin E. Gold, Economic Development Projects: A Perspective, 19 URB. LAW.
193, 193-99 (1987) (describing the many benefits of private redevelopment, includ-
ing site improvements, increased employment, increased spending leverage, in-
creased tax revenue, energy conservation, and inter-city competition).
124 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 85
(1986) (explaining how awarding eminent domain surplus to the condemnor encour-
ages positive uses of eminent domain, much as profit encourages positive activities in
the market).
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ally produces greater reciprocal benefits to the owner. 125 They argue
that when government takes land for a traditional public use, such as
for a highway, it is more likely that the owner receives significant com-
pensation indirectly through the public benefits associated with such
projects, accounting for the gap between market value compensation
and the actual value of the land to the owner. 126 Accordingly, the law
should require a higher measure of direct compensation when gov-
ernment takes land for private redevelopment than when it retains
the land for direct public use.
12 7
I am skeptical of this argument for two reasons. First, it rests on
untested empirical assumptions about the general benefits of differing
kinds of eminent domain projects. The argument seems to be quite
skeptical of the public benefits of redevelopment projects, while gen-
erously assuming the significant and widespread public benefits of
traditional eminent domain projects, such as transportation
projects. 128 But these generalizations might not be warranted. Both
redevelopment projects and transportation projects create general
benefits throughout the community, and both usually fail to benefit
or please all members of the community. Both can benefit some pri-
vate individuals and entities significantly more than others, and for
this reason can be politically motivated and wasteful. 129 And yet both
have the potential to create widely dispersed public benefits.
Suppose, for example, that a city takes one homeowner's house
to acquire land for a Walmart store, and another homeowner's house
to make a freeway exit ramp next to the Walmart store. Both condem-
nations would benefit Walmart uniquely, and yet both could also pro-
duce widespread public benefits. There is no basis to assume, just
because one taking is for a traditional public use and the other is for
redevelopment, that more members of the public will benefit from
the convenience of using the freeway access ramp than will benefit
from the convenience of shopping at Walmart. And certainly, there is
no basis to assume that the owner whose land is taken for the freeway
access is more adequately compensated by it than the first owner is
125 See Krier & Serkin, supra note 120, at 865-73.
126 Id. at 867 (proposing that eminent domain actions exist along a public use
spectrum, and that as one moves away from classic public uses towards naked trans-
fers, reciprocal benefits to the owner decline).
127 Id. at 868-69.
128 Compare id. at 866 (discussing how the reciprocal benefits of traditional public
uses will even out over time as government takes property from different people),
with id. at 869 (discussing the uneven benefits of redevelopment projects, as in Kelo).
129 See Galles, supra note 76 (criticizing a recent federal transportation bill as a
collection of indefensible pork-barrel projects).
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compensated by his ability to shop at Walmart. The only way to be
reasonably sure whether any owner is compensated by reciprocal ben-
efits of this sort is to examine such benefits case by case, which would
eliminate the need for differing compensation standards.
Second, the usual rule for applying reciprocal benefits towards
the government's compensation obligation is that general public ben-
efits do not count; only benefits that are special to the owner in rela-
tion to the specific project can offset the government's compensation
obligation. 130 The reason for the rule against offsetting general pub-
lic benefits from the government's compensation obligation is consis-
tent with the equalizing function of just compensation: since other
members of the public typically do not pay special assessments for the
general benefits they receive from public projects, neither should a
condemnee be forced to pay a special assessment for such benefits in
the form of lost property and reduced compensation, merely because
the government happened to need his land.
31
Thus, the fact that condemnees generally benefit from roads and
other public goods, like all members of the public do, is not a suffi-
cient reason for awarding compensation below the subjective indem-
nity standard, even in traditional public use cases. And the fact that
some third party will ultimately acquire the land, or otherwise benefit
uniquely from it, does not seem tojustify requiring the condemnor to
pay the owner more compensation than should be required if the
land was taken for a traditional public use.
C. Unreasonable and Unverified Value
The two most serious problems with awarding compensation ac-
cording to an owner's subjective value have to do with unreasonable
and unverified subjective values. Some people, given the choice,
would not sell their homes at any price, and others would not sell for
130 See 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 52, § 8A.02[6], at 8A-47
("[T]he Supreme Court of the United States and a majority of other jurisdictions
have held that only special benefits may be constitutionally setoff."). Even in the mi-
nority of jurisdictions that allow the offset of general benefits, the offset only may
reduce an owner's severance damages; it does not apply to the valuation of the con-
demned parcel. See, e.g., id. § 8A.03[7], at 8A-66 to -69 (describing California law); id.
§ 8A.03[25], at 8A-90 to -92 (describing Michigan law); id. § 8A.03[43], at 8A-110
(describing South Carolina law).
131 See id. § 8A.02[6], at 8A-47 ("General benefits may not be used to offset dam-
ages because the owner whose land is taken would be placed in a worse position than
his neighbor whose estate lies outside the path of the improvement and who shares in
the increased value without any pecuniary loss.").
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less than many times their homes' market value.1 32 Moreover, in an
eminent domain proceeding, some would pretend to value their
homes more than they actually do if it could gain them greater com-
pensation according to a subjective standard. For these reasons, no
system of eminent domain can leave all owners subjectively whole,
and, indeed, perhaps in some cases it should not.
Eminent domain law should recognize that there is a point at
which an owner's subjective valuation of land in dollars can be so high
that it does not correlate with the land's highest actual value to soci-
ety.133 Rather, extremely high subjective valuations might simply indi-
cate that the owner does not value wealth very much beyond a certain
point,134 or that the owner is unreasonably unwilling to accommodate
the broader interests of society. Extreme and unusual attachments to
material things may be akin to fetishism and are not something that
law should necessarily encourage or value. 13 5 When significant public
interests are at stake, it is reasonable for government to require prop-
erty owners sometimes to accommodate the interests of society, and if
no amount of compensation could make the owner subjectively
whole, it is reasonable for government sometimes to take property for
132 For example, at a public hearing prior to Detroit's acquisition of Poletown,
one of the homeowners who had lived in his house for forty-six years angrily protested
the City's action and drew cheers when he emphatically told the City that his house
was worth a million dollars to him. WYLIE, supra note 64, at 63.
133 Although simple economic models often reasonably assume that a resource
will generate the most social utility if it is allocated to the person or group who is
willing to pay the most for it, this assumption becomes less plausible when extremely
large values are at stake. First, not everyone in society has the ability to bargain for
high-priced resources, and thereby register their preferences in the market. Second,
because of the declining marginal utility of wealth (i.e., the more money one has, or
considers acquiring in an exchange, the less each additional dollar is worth to the
individual in terms of increased happiness), expensive resources generally produce
more utility per dollar when they are widely shared than when one person owns the
whole resource. In other words, one person's refusal to sell something for less than
one hundred million dollars does not equal, in terms of social utility, the interest of
one hundred million people who would be willing each to contribute one dollar for
the same resource as a public good.
134 This preference may well be reasonable, but it nevertheless precludes assum-
ing in all cases that an owner's subjective valuation represents the land's highest value
to society if it exceeds the government's valuation, for reasons stated supra in note
133.
135 See Radin, supra note 25, at 968-70 (discussing how the personhood theory of
property must confront the problem of fetishism, and should establish objective
limits).
2oo6]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
less than full subjective compensation. This is a further reason why
government's eminent domain power exists.
136
In any case, even if one does not agree that some subjective values
are unreasonable, there is the practical problem of verifying subjective
values. 137 When compensation is based on subjective value, owners
have an enormous incentive to exaggerate what their homes are worth
to them personally. In many cases, there would be no way for a neu-
tral fact-finder to know whether an owner's own reported valuation is
accurate, exaggerated, or self-deluded.' 38 The law could in theory put
the matter to juries and ask them to guess case by case what sum of
money would reasonably compensate each homeowner for his or her
lost subjective value. But this approach would be highly inaccurate
and unpredictable. Such a system would tend to reward those home-
owners who are most willing to litigate, who value honesty the least,
and who are the most sympathetic to juries. Because of the system's
unpredictability, it could also generate significant transaction costs
and lead to fewer settlements between condemnors and owners.
The fact that we cannot accurately measure subjective home
value, however, is not a good reason for limiting compensation strictly
to market value, if there are other methods of more closely approxi-
mating what homes are reasonably worth to their owners. As a gen-
eral matter, eminent domain law significantly undercompensates for
homes, which leads to the taking of too many homes. A general cor-
rection in the direction of increased compensation would improve
matters significantly.
D. Standardizing Home Value
One reasonable approach to improving the valuation of homes
would be to use a statutory formula to increase the compensation as
136 See William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv.
553, 559-60 (1972) (describing the views of Grotius and other early writers that emi-
nent domain is justified because "public advantage" must prevail over "private
advantage").
137 See Merrill, supra note 124, at 83-84 (discussing the difficulty of measuring
subjective value).
138 For this reason, even a self-reporting mechanism with a penalty for false report-
ing, such as proposed by Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, see Abraham Bell
& Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REv. 277, 300-07 (2001), would
not work for adjudicating subjective value, because auditors would have no reliable
way of finding whether someone has falsely reported such value. Bell and Parchomov-
sky's model is designed to measure changes in market value for derivative takings with
improved efficiency; they do not offer it as a method to measure subjective value. See
id. at 316.
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percentage of market value. For example, eminent domain law might
require government to pay homeowners market value plus X percent
of the home's market value, where Xdepends on how long the owner
has lived in the home.13 9 A statutory model along these lines is in-
cluded as an Appendix to this Article. 140 The example would award a
homeowner an additional two percent of market value for every year
that the owner has lived in the home as an owner, up to a bonus of
sixty percent for owners who have lived in their homes for thirty years
or longer. 4
1
A statutory correction to the law ofjust compensation such as this
has several advantages. First, it would more adequately deter govern-
ment from taking homes than current law does, especially the homes
of people who tend to value their homes the most, without making it
too costly to take homes in cases of genuine public necessity. To the
extent that government agencies pass on the costs of eminent domain
to private redevelopers, this system would also deter private redevelop-
ers from using eminent domain simply to acquire land cheaply. Of
course, what factor of market value would achieve optimal deterrence
(against government and private redevelopers) is something that rea-
sonable people might disagree about, and legislatures rather than
courts should have the final word in setting this value. But clearly
optimal deterrence does not arise by allowing government to take
homes merely for market value, even for traditional public uses.
Using a compensation formula to deter government's overuse of
eminent domain is also preferable to heightened scrutiny and proce-
dural alternatives in that it does not require courts to second-guess the
policy judgments of government agencies and cities. Instead, it would
require governmental agencies to prove that their projects are impor-
tant enough to take away homes by what they are willing to pay. This
would require less litigation than heightened scrutiny or NEPA-type
139 Robert Ellickson has suggested legislative schedules, based on factors that cor-
relate with high subjective value, as a means of compensating for the nontransferable
elements of land value without incurring high administrative costs. See Robert C. El-
lickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls,
40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 736-37 (1973). Similarly, Victoria, Australia reportedly allows
condemnees to claim up to ten percent of a home's value to account for subjective
losses, which award may be adjusted according to the length of time the owner has
lived in the home. See MurrayJ. Raff, Planning Law and Compulsory Acquisition in Aus-
tralia, in TAKING LAND: COMPULSORY PURCHASE AND REGULATION IN ASIAN-PACIFIC
COUNTRIES 27, 44 (Tsuyoshi Kotaka & David Callies eds., 2002) (describing the Aus-
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solutions, and would reasonably distinguish projects of genuine public
necessity from those that do not justify taking homes, because the lo-
cal governments that know their public's interests best would be mak-
ing the ultimate decisions. Moreover, because the additional
compensation would be determined by a statutory formula, the added
element would cause no additional uncertainty.
A statutory formula increasing home value would also have the
benefit of accommodating two kinds of horizontal fairness. First, by
applying the same standard of compensation to all homeowners ac-
cording to a set formula, the law would avoid wide disparities between
what displaced homeowners receive in similar circumstances. At the
same time, a formula based on a rough estimation of how homeown-
ers typically value their own homes, rather than how the market values
those homes, would come much closer than current law does to
achieving fairness between displaced homeowners as a group and
other members of society. No longer would the displaced homeown-
ers generally suffer a disproportionate share of the cost of public
projects. Some displaced homeowners would feel advantaged as a re-
sult of the government's need for their property, and others would
still feel disadvantaged. But on average, at least, a well crafted formula
should leave displaced homeowners close to indifferent.
142
Importantly, a rule setting just compensation at "market value
plus Xpercent" for eminent domain purposes would not prohibit gov-
ernment agencies from offering to buy homes for less than the emi-
nent domain price. Indeed, in many cases, it would make sense for
the government and an owner to agree to exchange property for less
than the statutory eminent domain price if they both value the land
for less.1 43 A system that sets the eminent domain price of land higher
than its market value, therefore, should encourage governments more
often to bargain for property in the manner that private purchasers
do. At the same time, it would allow governments a way to bypass the
market in cases where the public interest depends upon acquiring a
142 Using a formula to standardize the social obligations of individuals is a com-
mon regulatory tool, especially where it is difficult to adjudicate relevant facts without
a high risk of error. For example, the Uniform Probate Code determines a dece-
dent's statutory obligation to provide for a surviving spouse based on how long the
marriage existed, roughly assuming that the longer a marriage has existed the more
the married partners have a reasonable expectation to share each other's wealth upon
death. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 102 (1998).
143 Although some risk of bargaining failure remains in this situation because of a
potential bilateral monopoly, see supra Part V.A, the potential bargaining range is
significantly restricted by the government's ability to acquire the property at "market
value plus X percent," thus making bargaining failure a far less serious problem than
in a system with no eminent domain power.
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particular lot, and where the owner is unwilling to sell for less than
the above-market eminent domain price.
To be sure, a system that links compensation to how long the
owner has lived in the home could affect some homeowners' incen-
tives. Some owners who know that the government will likely need
their land for a future eminent domain project will know that if they
move before the government is ready to buy, they will lose the en-
hanced element of compensation due to them in eminent domain,
and therefore might choose to stay to exploit this benefit. But no
reasonable owner would choose to stay for this reason if it made him
worse off. Moreover, sometimes governments and owners would find
it possible to bargain around these incentives. To the extent that this
does cause some residual inefficiency in an owner's housing decisions,
it is probably a reasonable price to incur as a cost of making the over-
all standard of compensation generally more accurate, and of improv-
ing the government's incentives relating to eminent domain.
CONCLUSION
Commentators, property-rights advocates, and Justice Thomas
are all correct to be concerned about how easily government can
force people out of their homes for insubstantial reasons. Eminent
domain law fails to protect the home adequately, and for this reason
needs reform.
The most commonly suggested response to this problem-to nar-
row the public use doctrine-is not the only potential solution, and
indeed is not the most accurate solution. I have examined in this Arti-
cle several methods of reforming eminent domain law to protect the
sanctity of the home, including the public use solution, heightened
scrutiny solutions, procedural solutions, and the compensation solu-
tion. All of these methods have their benefits, and could potentially
work in combination. Of these methods, however, the compensation
solution appears to be the most promising. Rather than requiring
courts to second-guess the decisions of local governments, it would
aim to correct the incentive structure of such governments, forcing
them to internalize into their budgetary costs a more reasonable ap-
proximation of the intrinsic value of a home.
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APPENDIX: MODEL STATUTORY PROVISION FOR PROTECTING HOMES
Compensation for Personal Detachment from the Home
(a) When a state or local agency uses eminent domain to acquire
property that is used by the owner as a primary residence, the agency
shall compensate the owner by paying (in addition to the property's
market value and any relocation expenses required by law) a personal
detachment award determined in accordance with subsection (c).
(b) The personal detachment award represents the non-pecuni-
ary losses that homeowners commonly experience when they are dis-
placed from homes. This includes, but is not limited to, emotional
losses, aesthetic losses, disruption of expectations, loss of reasonable
sentimental attachment, and detachment from community. The re-
quirement to pay a personal detachment award is also designed to
discourage agencies from condemning owner-occupied homes when
reasonable alternatives are available.
(c) The personal detachment award shall be determined accord-
ing to the length of time that the owner has continuously lived in the
home under a claim of title, according to the following table:
If the owner has continuously lived in The personal detachment award
the home under a claim of title for: shall equal:
Less than 2 years 2% of the home's market value
At least 2 years but less than 4 years 4% of the home's market value
At least 4 years but less than 6 years 8% of the home's market value
At least 6 years but less than 8 years 12% of the home's market value
At least 8 years but less than 10 years 16% of the home's market value
At least 10 years but less than 12 years 20% of the home's market value
At least 12 years but less than 14 years 24% of the home's market value
At least 14 years but less than 16 years 28% of the home's market value
At least 16 years but less than 18 years 32% of the home's market value
At least 18 years but less than 20 years 36% of the home's market value
At least 20 years but less than 22 years 40% of the home's market value
At least 22 years but less than 24 years 44% of the home's market value
At least 24 years but less than 26 years 48% of the home's market value
At least 26 years but less than 28 years 52% of the home's market value
At least 28 years but less than 30 years 56% of the home's market value
30 years or more 60% of the home's market value
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(d) For purposes of this section, an owner has continuously lived
in a home under a claim of title for as long as he or she has (i) contin-
uously maintained the home as a primary residence; and (ii) continu-
ously maintained ownership or a colorable claim of ownership of the
property. A temporary absence from a home, including temporary
rental of the home to another, does not disqualify an owner from
claiming it as a continuous personal residence if the period of absence
is reasonable and if the owner maintains the intention to return to the
home.
(e) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, an owner
shall not be entitled to the personal detachment award if: (i) at the
time the owner acquired ownership in the home he or she had notice
of the government's intentions to condemn the property; and (ii) the
condemnation occurred within two years following the owner's acqui-
sition of title to the property.
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